File Security

Control reads refuse aliases into writable data and validate ownership, permissions and size through the handles used to read the document.

Control Documents

fs::read_control and settings::read walk directory components without following user-controlled links. They check each directory's ownership and write permissions, then open and read the regular file through its parent handle. Final symbolic links and files with other hard links are refused. A missing document becomes defaults only when its existing ancestor prefix passes the same checks.

Untrusted Folders

A folder that fails the checks is refused as fs::Untrusted: the file, the folder, its owner and which rule it broke (Distrust::Owner, owned by neither root nor you, or Distrust::Written, written by others than its owner). lnk says so as a refusal naming that folder. Inside an unprivileged user namespace, such as a sandbox's own network, / is owned by the kernel's overflow user, and Link reads no settings there.

Modules Reading No Control

Before running a module's command, lnk checks the folders its settings are in. A module whose module.toml says reads-control = false under [module] reads no settings, map, grant or credential, so it skips that check. Only the offline manual, lnk man, says so, and a test holds it to that, so the manual opens where the folders can't be trusted.

Nothing Handed to Them

Skipping the check can't bring such a module control another way. lnk hands it no secrets, no artifact cache and no list of modules read from its settings. The manual renders in the default look and keeps no records, rather than reading the settings that would say otherwise.

Linked Roots

A home reached through a link, as /home is var/home on Fedora Atomic or a network home linked in, is read where HOME names it. The strict read resolves only the root a path is under, the user's home as HOME names it or one of the system roots, once. It then walks the real path from /, checking every folder's ownership and write permissions as before. A link below the root, such as one in a Safe, is still refused.

System Aliases

layout.toml lists the OS alias locations a strict read may traverse. The alias and its parent must be root-owned, with the parent writable only by root. Its target is expanded through the same checked walk, which refuses cycles and further unapproved links. Root ownership alone does not permit an arbitrary alias in a root user's granted data.

Owner Boundaries

Callers select control locations through the typed layout catalogue. Ordinary input documents may use fs::read_trusted with their own trust policy; that does not make input into trusted control. A pinned parent keeps subsequent operations relative to that directory if its path is renamed. Sandboxes separately close Safes and writes to installed programs.